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Highlights
•	 Due	to	the	small	size	of	their	national	markets,	V4	countries	(Czech	
Republic,	Hungary,	Poland	and	Slovakia)	should	undertake	a	joint	im-
plementation	of	the	Gas	Target	Model	that	has	been	proposed	for	the	
European	market.
•	 A	V4	level	 implementation	would	benefit	 from	current	interconnec-
tion	plans	and	allow	improved	competition	and	liquidity,	and	a	better	
exploitation	of	new	market	opportunities.
•	 Joint	V4	 implementation	proposals	would	be	more	 likely	 to	succeed	
if	in	line	with	private	development	interests	and	with	other	initiatives	
undertaken	in	the	wider	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.
•	 Theoretical	 available	models	 span	 from	 a	 single	 price	 and	 balancing	
zone,	to	a	single	price	zone	with	separate	balancing	areas	(trading	re-
gion),	to	market	coupling	and	to	independent	connection	to	an	external	
liquid	market.		
•	 In	practice,	theoretical	models	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	The	trading	
region	between	Austria,	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia	could	be	accom-
panied	by	transitional	market	coupling	with	Hungary	and	Poland,	with	
a	view	to	full	integration.
•	 Timely	completion	of	 interconnection	plans	and	harmonised	 imple-
mentation	of	European	Network	Codes	would	underpin	the	process;	
on	 the	contrary,	 single-handedly	customer	protection	measures	may	
hamper	market	development	and	integration.
•	 Institutional	development	should	be	minimised	and	existing	or	mar-
ket-driven	 forms	 of	 coordination	 should	 be	 preferred.	 Further	TSO	
collaboration	is	likely,	and	could	lead	to	alliances,	as	recently	experi-
enced	by	other	European	TSOs.	
1.	 This	Policy	Brief	is	largely	based	on	a	Report	prepared	for	the	Ośrodek	Studiów	
Wschodnich	 (Centre	 for	 Eastern	 Studies),	Warsaw,	 Poland,	 under	 Interna-
tional	Vysehrad	Fund’s	Standard	Grant	No.	21220287	Responsibility	about	the	
contents	remains	only	with	the	author.
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The current situation, challenges  
and opportunities
The	natural	gas	markets	of	Vysehrad	Four	(V4)	countries	are	
characterised	by	very	similar	problems:	dominance	of	Russian	
supplies	 under	 long	 term,	 oil	 linked	 contracts;	 limited	 inter-
connection	 (except	 between	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 Slovakia);	
overwhelming	 East-West	 flows;	 limited,	 though	 growing,	
internal	 competition	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 poor	 market	
liquidity;	expected	increasing	demand	due	to	the	gradual	loss	
of	competitiveness	of	more	polluting	fuels,	as	well	as	of	more	
gas	penetration	in	the	residential	market	(notably	in	Poland).	
Because	of	 these	 facts,	V4	 countries	have	 long	 suffered	 from	
low	security	of	supply	standards.
The	 similarity	 of	 issues	 and	 geographical	 proximity	 have	 led	
the	V4	countries	to	undertake	closer	collaboration,	notably	by	
agreeing	on	a	 common	 security	of	 supply	 strategy,	 including	
regional	emergency	planning.	It	is	not	surprising	that	they	have	
also	 opted	 for	 a	 common	 implementation	 of	 the	Gas Target 
Model	that	has	been	adopted	for	the	medium-long	term	design	
of	the	EU	gas	market.	Yet	it	is	clear	that	Slovakia	and	even	more	
the	Czech	Republic	are	more	integrated	into	the	Western	Euro-
pean	market,	 thanks	 to	 larger	 interconnection	endowed	with	
firm	reverse	flow	capacity;	whereas	Hungary	has	several	inter-
connections	 that	 require	 improvement,	 and	 the	 interconnec-
tion	of	Poland	with	Western	Europe	and	the	other	V4	countries	
is	very	limited	yet.	Market	competition	so	far	has	suffered	from	
the	small	size	of	national	markets,	entailed	by	these	infrastruc-
tural	characteristics.	However,	ambitious	plans	lead	to	expect	
effective	interconnection	of	all	V4	countries	by	2017-18,	as	part	
of	the	North-South Corridor	in	Central	Europe.
V4	collaboration	on	the	gas	market	starts	at	a	time	of	important	
changes,	which	are	sources	of	challenges	as	well	as	of	oppor-
tunities.	Cheaper	gas	has	been	available	in	the	West	for	a	few	
years,	largely	as	LNG	landed	in	Western	Europe.	Although	this	
source	has	been	dried	by	the	overwhelming	demand	growth	of	
emerging	markets,	gas	demand	stagnation	and	a	wave	of	price	
reviews	 has	 kept	 spot	 prices	 in	 the	 most	 advanced	 markets	
below	those	of	V4	countries.	
The	 implementation	of	 the	European	Network	Codes	 and	of	
the	 recently	 adopted	EU	Congestion	Management	 rules	may	
further	open	up	pipeline	capacity	with	Turkey	and	Greece,	in	
the	same	way	as	it	has	recently	happened	for	interconnections	
between	 V4	 countries	 and	 their	Western	 neighbours,	 which	
have	become	partly	 available	 for	 (physical	or	virtual)	 reverse	
flow	services.	More	generally,	ENCs	will	require	a	major	review	
of	market	regulation,	which	represents	an	opportunity	for	har-
monization	within	 the	V4	 region,	with	 a	 view	 to	 establish	 a	
common	market.
On	the	other	hand,	the	postponement	of	the	Nabucco	project	
is	widely	seen	as	a	stop	on	new	supplies	to	the	region,	although	
more	 could	 come	 through	 the	 new	 expected	 TAP	 or	 South	
Stream	pipelines.	
Less	certain	but	potentially	even	larger	change	potential	could	
obtain	from	other	sources,	like	new	production	opportunities	
in	the	region	and	in	the	neighbouring	countries,	notably	from	
unconventional	gas	plays,	as	well	as	from	new	LNG	terminals	
in	 Poland	 and	 the	 Balkans.	 Surprises	 may	 also	 and	 a	 more	
aggressive	competitive	behaviour	by	companies	that	sell	Rus-
sian	gas,	which	might	be	strengthened	after	the	partial	lifting	of	
the	Gazprom	monopoly.
Hence,	 the	 V4	 decision	 to	 cooperate	 for	 the	 exploitation	 of	
these	opportunities	is	clearly	justified.	The	GTM	studies	have	
noticed	 that	 investments	 aimed	at	 a	 certain	market	 areas	 are	
boosted	by	the	availability	of	a	liquid	and	reasonably	competi-
tive	market.	 In	 turn	 this	 requires	a	market	 size	of	 at	 least	20	
Bcm/year	and	the	availability	of	at	least	three	different	sources,	
with	 a	 reasonably	 low	 market	 concentration	 (with	 an	 HHI	
index	around	2000)2.	None	of	the	V4	countries	can	individu-
ally	achieve	any	of	these	conditions	at	present:	only	Poland	may	
have	 such	 capacity	 in	 coming	 years,	 although	 through	 LNG	
supplies	that	may	be	rather	costly	in	the	short	term	and	a	very	
dramatic	 fall	 of	 the	 incumbent’s	 market	 share,	 which	 could	
probably	 be	 achieved	 only	 by	 an	 aggressive	 gas	 release	 pro-
gramme.	Otherwise,	the	availability	of	three	different	sources	
is	currently	possible	only	through	“backhaul”	supplies	from	the	
West,	which	is	not	direct,	often	interruptible	and	therefore	less	
reliable.	On	the	other	hand	a	common	V4	market	would	allow	
the	achievement	of	 at	 least	 two	 such	conditions	 (market	 size	
and	concentration)	and	help	achieving	 the	 third	one	by	 trig-
gering	investment	in	new	supplies	and	connections.	
Principles of an enhanced V4 collaboration
The	political	 proposals	 for	 a	 joint	V4	 implementation	 of	 the	
GTM	calls	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	virtual	 trading	point	 in	
the	region,	supported	by	a	single	balancing	zone,	and	with	an	
energy	 exchange	 for	 gas	 trading.	 Harmonised	 transmission	
products	would	 ensure	 gas	 flows	 throughout	 the	 region	 and	
across	it.
It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 implementation	of	 these	cornerstones	
should	be	consistent	with	three	policy	principles:
1.	 	 	 Any	market	 design	 should	 be	 implemented	 consistently	
with	 market	 opportunities,	 possibly	 by	 means	 of	 policy	
instruments	that	are	suitable	to	foster	the	smoothest	con-
vergence	 of	 business	 and	 political	 decisions	 (including	
2.	 Jean-Michel	Glachant,	“A	Vision	for	the	EU	Target	Model:	the	MECO-S	
Model”,	 EUI	 Working	 Paper	 RSCAS	 2011/38;	 http://fsr.eui.eu/
Publications/WORKINGPAPERS/Energy/2011/WP201138.aspx
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taxes,	subsidies	and	action	by	government-owned	compa-
nies).	 In	other	words,	 the	objectives	of	V4	 collaboration	
should	be	fully	consistent	with	business	interests	and	com-
panies’	strategies	rather	than	against	them;
2.	 	 Existing	 cooperation	 projects	 extending	 beyond	 the	 V4	
region	should	be	encompassed	 in	 the	region	rather	 than	
substituted	 for,	 notably	 if	 these	 involve	 the	 integration	
with	more	advanced	and	competitive	markets;
3.				A	process	-	rather	than	an	abstract	market	design	-	should	
be	devised.	Priority	 should	be	given	 to	flexible	 solutions	
that	may	evolve	into	one	of	the	available	theoretical	model,	
or	a	combination	of	them,	without	regrets	for	any	invest-
ment	that	might	have	been	taken	towards	inadequate	solu-
tions.
All	V4	countries	are	Members	of	the	South-South	East	Euro-
pean	market	region,	one	of	three	into	which	the	Gas	Regional	
Initiative	 is	articulated	(GRI	SSE:	 it	also	comprises	 Italy,	Slo-
venia,	 Austria,	 Romania,	 Bulgaria,	 Cyprus	 and	Greece).	The	
V4	countries	have	important	interconnections	with	other	SSE	
countries,	 in	particular	with	Austria	and	Romania,	as	well	as	
with	 other	 EU	 countries,	 particularly	 Germany.	 Within	 the	
GRI	SSE,	several	pilot	projects	and	studies	involving	V4	coun-
tries	are	currently	 in	preparation.	Almost	all	of	 them	involve	
relationships	on	the	East-West	axis,	like	the	GATRAC	project	
between	 the	Czech,	 the	Slovak	and	a	German	TSO	(Ontras),	
allowing	 for	 the	 purchase	 and	 management	 of	 bundled	
capacity	across	the	three	borders;	bundled	capacity	allocation	
project	between	Poland	and	Germany’s	and	between	Hungary	
and	Romania.	Further	common	activities	deal	with	the	imple-
mentation	of	EASEE-Gas	Common	Business	Practices,	a	cross	
border	balancing	platform,	and	a	trading	region	including	Aus-
tria,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia.
Applicable high level design models
The	 integration	of	V4	countries	may	 start	 from	several	basic	
models.	Some	of	them	can	also	be	combined	or	modified,	so	
that	 they	 become	 different	 development	 stages	 of	 the	 same	
process	 rather	 than	 alternative	 solutions.	 Their	 feasibility	 is	
related	to	infrastructure	development	in	various	ways	that	are	
discussed	in	the	Report.	
•	 Single cross border market zone.	The	establishment	of	a	single	
entry-exit	and	balancing	zone	has	the	advantage	of	ensuring	
the	achievement	of	the	GTM	objectives	in	terms	of	market	
size	and	concentration,	and	could	bring	the	V4	close	to	the	
GTM	objective	 of	 having	 access	 to	 al	 least	 three	 different	
significant	 sources	 once	 suitable	 interconnection	 is	 devel-
oped	for	interconnection.	The	objective	would	be	fully	met	
if	connections	to	new	sources	like	Caspian	gas	or	Mediter-
ranean	LNG	are	built,	or	 if	new	unconventional	 resources	
are	developed	inside	the	V4	countries.	On	the	other	hand,	
this	is	a	demanding	solution,	as	it	requires	full	harmonisa-
tion	of	market	rules	and	practices,	lack	of	internal	conges-
tion	 and	 a	 single	market	 operator.	This	 solution	 does	 not	
necessarily	 require	 the	 full	merger	 of	TSOs,	 but	 at	 least	 a	
very	close	cooperation	and	probably	the	establishment	of	a	
coordination	body	 for	 revenue	 compensation,	 dispatching	
and	balancing	related	activities.	A	single	market	operator	is	
expected	to	emerge	once	the	zone	merger	is	complete.
•	 Trading region.	This	concept	has	been	suggested	as	an	option	
for	the	European	GTM.	It	envisages	a	single	tariff	and	price	
zone	(and	hence	a	single	market	operator)	but	separate	bal-
ancing	areas,	which	may	coincide	with	individual	(National)	
TSOs,	or	parts	thereof.	Like	the	next	one	(market	coupling),	
this	model	is	unprecedented	in	gas,	and	needs	to	be	clarified	
on	several	aspects.	It	would	still	require	a	remarkable	coor-
dination	effort	on	tariff	and	dispatching	issues,	but	less	than	
with	the	single	zone.
•	 Multiple coupled market zones.	 Several	 zones	 with	 for-
mally	working	 spot	markets,	 though	not	 very	 liquid,	may	
be	connected	through	market	coupling	once	they	are	inter-
connected.	The	 interconnection	may	be	 limited	 and	 some	
congestion	may	occur	and	 it	would	be	 treated	by	an	algo-
rithm	where	different	prices	may	emerge	after	joint	bids	are	
presented	daily	in	the	coupled	zones.	This	solution	requires	
less	interconnection	investment	but	some	market	rules	har-
monisation	effort,	as	for	the	single	price	zone.	Yet	no	single	
tariff	 or	 dispatching	 are	 necessary.	There	may	 be	 separate	
market	operators	but	a	common	office	for	market	coupling	
must	be	designated.	The	main	difficulty	is	the	very	limited	
experience	in	adopting	the	market	coupling	concept	in	gas	
markets.	Some	experience	and	studies	are	being	developed	
within	the	NNW	Gas	Regional	Initiative	and	may	provide	
advice	 about	 the	 feasibility	 and	 condition	 of	market	 cou-
pling.
•	 Independent connection to more liquid zones.	 This	 solu-
tion	avoids	any	proposal	of	active	market	integration,	with	
the	 exception	of	 those	necessary	 to	 ensure	 the	 security	 of	
supply	 standards	 required	 by	 Regulation	 994/2010/EC.	
This	 approach	 considers	 that	markets	 can	 in	 fact	 be	 inte-
grated,	with	 substantial	 price	 alignment,	 by	market	 forces	
that	select	one	or	more	favourite	trading	spots,	which	act	as	
benchmarks	for	other	market	zones.	This	happens	if	all	con-
nected	zones	can	“shop”	 in	 that	market,	even	with	 limited	
direct	 interconnection	 between	 them.	 Likewise,	V4	 coun-
tries	may	limit	their	interconnection	and	harmonisation	to	
what	is	justified	by	market	decisions	or	physical	security	of	
supply	requirements,	but	decide	to	elect	(e.g.)	a	German	(or	
a	future	merged	German-Dutch)	hub	as	their	natural	mar-
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ketplace.	Under	this	solution,	the	regulatory	strategy	would	
be	partly	different	and	focus	more	on	ensuring	the	viability	
of	connections	with	the	most	liquid	hubs	and	the	availability	
of	transmission	products	to	move	gas	from/to	it.
Proposals for joint GTM V4 implementa-
tion and related difficulties.
Upon	consideration	of	the	possible	models,	the	market	situa-
tion	and	opportunities	and	the	available	theoretical	models	for	
market	integration,	the	following	strategy	may	be	proposed	for	
joint	GTM	implementation	in	the	V4	stakeholders.	This	pro-
posal	considers	the	most	likely	development	of	new	infrastruc-
ture,	notably	interconnections	between	the	V$	countries,	and	
is	tailored	so	that	deeper	integration	follows	the	completion	of	
the	connecting	pipelines.
i.   Establishment of working connection among the V4 and 
with neighbouring countries.	 NRAs	 and	 TSOs	 should	
work	 to	ensure	 that	market	 rules	and	procedures	ensure	
the	smoothest	connection	for	delivery	of	gas	to	and	from	
hubs	across	the	western	V4	border.	In	particular,	harmo-
nised	 capacity	 products	 should	 be	 developed	 as	 part	 of	
the	implementation	of	the	European	Capacity	Allocation	
Network	Code,	including	for	delivery	by	backhaul	(virtual	
reverse	flow),	between	all	 interconnected	V4	and	 if	pos-
sible	through	intermediate	countries.	The	products	should	
also	ensure	deliveries	to	and	from	working	Western	Euro-
pean	hubs.	This	activity	can	 start	 immediately	as	 it	does	
not	require	any	new	infrastructure.
ii.   Development of market zones. Existing	 entry-exit	market	
zones	 should	 be	 consolidated	 and	 remaining	 wholesale	
price	controls	gradually	phased	out.	The	market	zones	may	
include	 the	 Austrian/Czech/Slovak	 trading	 region	 pro-
posed	within	the	GRI-SSE,	using	the	large	existing	inter-
connection	 capacity	of	 the	 three	 countries.	However	 the	
adoption	of	this	solution	should	be	integrated	by	the	con-
nection	of	the	Hungarian	and	Polish	market	zones,	subject	
to	market	 coupling	due	 to	 the	 limited	 existing	 intercon-
nection.	It	is	however	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Policy	Brief	
to	take	positions	or	provide	suggestion	about	the	inclusion	
of	other	countries	into	the	V4	market.
iii.  Connection of the V4 countries.	 Physical	 interconnection	
between	Hungary,	Slovakia	and	Poland	as	well	as	enhance-
ment	of	the	link	between	the	Czech	Republic	and	Poland	
should	proceed	 rapidly	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 credibility	 of	 any	
further	 V4	 integration	 plans.	 Interconnections	 between	
the	V4	countries	and	absence	of	congestion	within	gas	net-
work	Is	a	prerequisite	for	further	actions	aimed	at	regional	
GTM	implementation.
iv.   Joint implementation of the European Network Codes.	This	
would	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 harmonised	 market	 rules	 that	
would	be	the	basis	of	integration	as	a	single	market	zones	
or	as	a	trading	region.	Coordinated	work	by	V4	NRAs	and	
TSOs	would	also	 facilitate	 their	hard	 tasks	 in	 the	 imple-
mentation	of	ENCs,	 and	 improve	 regulatory	quality	 and	
stability.	
v.	 	 	 	In	particular	NRAs’ and TSOs’	cooperation	would	be	tar-
geted	at:
a. the establishment of a single entry-exit tariff zone;
b. Coordinated implementation of the Capacity 
Allocation Mechanism (CAM);
c. A coordinated capacity development mechanism, 
based on integrated auctions or open seasons, 
with contributions from public institutions; 
d. Harmonised balancing rules would be useful, 
although this would not necessarily mean the 
merging of the balancing zones, which should be 
decided at a later stage;
e. Common congestion management criteria, in line 
with the new Annex I of Regulation 715/2009/EC.
vi.	 	 V4	 countries	 should	 also	 work	 towards	 the	 adoption	 of	
common criteria for customer protection,	based	on	whole-
sale	 prices	 established	 in	 the	 V4	 market(s).	 It	 is	 worth	
recalling	 that	 the	 (even	 perceived)	 imposition	 of	 price	
freezes	 that	 may	 not	 cover	 costs	 is	 a	 major	 obstacle	 of	
market	liberalisation	and	integration	and	should	be	tem-
porary	and	related	to	objective	criteria.
vii. Implementation of a single market zone in the V4 region	
Standardised	capacity	products	 linking	 the	 zones	 should	
be	 developed	 building	 on	 the	 examples	 that	 are	 being	
developed	 (GATRAC,	 PRISMA,	Hungary-Romania	 etc.)	
and	 be	 subject	 to	 co-ordinated	 auctions.	 Other	 neigh-
bouring	 countries	 (Austria,	 Romania,	 Slovenia,	 Croatia,	
and	others)	may	be	invited	to	join	the	process.
viii. Decision on final market design. The	effort	to	carry	out	the	
previous	steps	will	probably	take	about	three	years.	Only	at	
that	point	and	in	relation	to	the	resulting	outcome	a	choice	
could	 be	made	 about	 the	 final	market	 design,	 choosing	
about	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 starting	 mix,	 a	 trading	
region	extended	to	all	V4	(and	possibly	other)	countries,	
or	a	large	single	market	and	balancing	zone.	The	outcome	
should	be	decided	by	an	operational	study	evaluating	the	
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possibility	of	dispatching	and	balancing	in	the	whole	zone	
in	relation	to	actual	flows	and	available	infrastructure.	
Institutional issues
The	pursuit	 of	 this	plan	would	 entail	 significant	 institutional	
developments.	In	order	to	enhance	the	credibility	and	ensure	a	
steady	implementation	of	the	plan,	several	entities	in	charge	of	
their	achievements	must	be	identified	or	created.	The	establish-
ment	of	 joint	bodies	 for	an	enhanced	co-operation	at	 the	V4	
level	would	stress	the	credibility	of	the	market	rules,	as	inter-
nationally	coordinated	regulations	are	much	more	stable	than	
national	ones.
However,	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 bodies	 should	 be	 minimised	
to	avoid	bureaucratisation.	The	GRI	SSE	may	offer	a	 suitable	
institutional	 framework	 for	 the	 regulatory	 harmonisation,	
provided	 it	 becomes	operational	 (following	 the	 electricity	RI	
example)	and	is	practically	articulated	into	smaller	sub-zones,	
among	 which	 one	 should	 be	 the	 V4.	 ENTSOG,	 ACER	 and	
other	 organisations	 also	 offer	 platforms	 for	 international	 co-
ordination.	On	the	other	hand,	it	should	be	clear	that	V4	inte-
gration	should	be	a	stronger	and	tighter	link	than	the	general	
EU	integration	process.
Within	 such	 framework,	 committees	 for	 the	 streamlining	 of	
market	rules	and	the	implementation	of	network	codes	could	
be	established,	with	 leading	 roles	divided	among	 the	partici-
pating	NRAs	and	TSOs,	in	charge	of	capacity	product	organi-
sation,	allocation	and	congestion	management;	interoperability	
and	business	practices;	tariffs;	and	balancing.
A	common	gas	exchange	need	not	be	established	by	interna-
tional	agreement	but	may	emerge	from	market	developments.	
On	the	other	hand,	a	body	 in	charge	of	 infrastructure	devel-
opment	procedure,	which	may	be	 located	at	 regulatory	 level,	
would	probably	be	useful.
TSO	 coordination	 of	 transmission	 management	 activities,	
tariff	 revenue	calculation	and	 redistribution	would	be	neces-
sary	 and	 would	 represent	 a	major	 development,	 as	 it	 would	
probably	 need	 the	 competences	 of	 an	 Independent	 System	
Operator.	This	 is	however	an	open	issue:	some	TSOs	even	in	
the	region	are	trying	to	envisage	cooperation	in	the	establish-
ment	of	common	market	zones	without	a	formal	coordination	
body.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 evolution	of	 the	European	 gas	
transmission	 industry	 is	 probably	 heading	 towards	 broader	
collaboration	and	alliances,	even	though	this	does	not	neces-
sarily	require	full	mergers.
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